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Publish/subscribe (pub/sub) is a widely deployed paradigm for information dissemination 
in a variety of distributed applications such as financial platforms, e-health frameworks and 
the Internet-of-Things. In essence, the pub/sub model considers one or more publishers 
generating feeds of information and a set of subscribers, the clients of the system. A pub/sub 
service is in charge of delivering the published information to interested clients. With the 
advent of cloud computing, we observe a growing tendency to externalize applications 
using pub/sub services to public clouds. This trend, despite its advantages, opens up 
multiple important data privacy and trust issues. Although multiple solutions for data 
protection have been proposed by the academic community, there is no unified view or 
framework describing how to deploy secure pub/sub systems on public clouds. To 
remediate this, we advocate towards a trust model which we believe can serve as basis for 
such deployments. 
Keywords: publish/subscribe, data privacy, security, trust, distributed systems. 
 
1. Introduction 
Many online applications are provided as distributed services, either because they are 
directed towards geographically-spread end users or because they connect a dispersed 
enterprise environment. Providing timely, efficient and scalable information dissemination 
is a requirement in all distributed applications. Publish/subscribe (pub/sub) is a paradigm 
for efficient information exchange in complex distributed systems. This communication 
model follows the producer/consumer design pattern, considering one or more publishers 
as source of feeds of information, and multiple subscribers as clients of this information. 
Subscribers register subscriptions detailing their interest in the published data. A variety 
of applications rely on this model, ranging from electronic commerce [8] to the 
management of medical records [24]. A canonical example used in the literature [5, 14, 35] 
is a financial application where publishers represent stock exchanges emitting information 
on new stock quotes, and where subscribers are investors monitoring market changes. A 
middleware layer situated between the publishers and the subscribers stores the 
subscriptions, matches these subscriptions with the incoming publication stream, and 
routes the relevant information to interested subscribers. Various designs exist for 
implementing such a middleware layer starting from a loosely defined architecture in the 
late 1980s [6] up to very recent blockchain-based frameworks [38]. The most common 
design is to distribute the matching and routing operations across an overlay of broker 
nodes. An overview of this model is given by Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Overview of a publish/subscribe architecture applied to a stock exchange use case 
Both the structure of the information available in publications and subscriptions and 
the matching model that the brokers allow have a strong impact on the design of a pub/sub 
system. An overview of design variants is presented in a survey by Eugster et al. [14]. 
There are two dominant variants of pub/sub: topic-based and content-based. In topic-based 
pub/sub subscriptions and publications are assigned to topics. Subscriptions match 
publications for the same topic, forming channels of information. For instance, in the stock 
exchange use case, messages could be assigned to a topic given by the stock symbol: 
subscribers registering for the symbol “IBM” will receive all publications tagged “IBM”. 
In content-based pub/sub matching is based on criteria on publications’ content. This 
content is typically condensed in a publication header, structured in key-value fields 
according to a publication schema. Subscriptions in the content-based model are 
conjunction of constraints over the values for these publication fields. Following our stock 
exchange example, a publication schema could include fields like: 
“symbol” (type:string),  
“value” (type:float),  
“date” (type:date),  
“variation” (type:float) 
A subscriber could then register a subscription such as: 
[(“symbol”=“IBM”) and (“value”>140) and (“date”=“3.2.2019”)]  
The content-based model allows clients to select at a finer grain the information they 
wish to receive. However, this model is also more challenging to implement, both from a 
performance point of view (since the matching and routing operations are more complex) 
but also, and perhaps more importantly, from the perspectives of privacy and trust. 
Subscriptions include sensitive information revealing subscribers’ interests. This 
information must be protected from prying eyes, yet allowing the matching operation to be 
performed by the routing middleware. For instance, investors interested in price variations 
of stocks do not want to divulge their financial strategies to other investors. In an e-health 
scenario supported by pub/sub, publications of medical records are highly sensitive. An e-
commerce application does not want the untrusted owner of the middleware infrastructure 
to sell information about buyers’ interests to competitor merchants.  
Data privacy and trust issues became more acute with the advent of cloud computing. 
Multiple services including pub/sub middleware are externalized to public and shared 
infrastructures. Cloud computing brings an economic advantage to service owners who are 
able to reduce their deployment and operation costs. However, middleware services, 
deployed on machines situated in a public domain are more prone to attacks [16, 29] and, 
therefore, to privacy and trust breaches. 
Multiple commercial frameworks and communication protocols implement the 
pub/sub paradigm in their design. Examples include the Microsoft .NET microservices 
framework [12], the MQTT protocol [39] for IoT integration, the instant messaging and 
VoIP protocol XMPP [21], and Pusher Channels [40]. However, none of these frameworks 
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considers by design data privacy and trust aspects. On the other hand, there exists an 
extensive amount of academic research that addresses the protection of data in 
subscriptions and publications, as well as associated performance/security tradeoffs [3]. 
These solutions generally focus on very specific technical aspects of a particular 
mechanism, do not consider the wider context of trust in a practical scenario, and are not 
used in practice. This state of fact is not an accident: designing secure and efficient pub/sub 
systems using untrusted middleware is very hard. 
The contribution of the present study is twofold. First, we provide in Section 2 more 
specific details about trust and data privacy issues in current pub/sub deployments, and we 
present an overview of current approaches for preserving data privacy in Section 3, 
grouped according to their subject of application. Second, in Section 4, we propose a trust 
model, which we believe can serve as basis for the successful integration of the 
mechanisms described in Section 3. We conclude our study in Section 5. 
 
2. Trust and Data Privacy 
In general, preserving data privacy refers to the capability of using the data of an entity 
while protecting the non-disclosure preferences of that entity. The enforcement of such 
preferences must be based on trust relations between entities and service providers. Privacy 
preferences can refer to either hiding the identity of the entity - anonymity, or to hiding 
data that might reveal some interests or other facts about the entity - confidentiality. We 
discuss below these two data privacy and trust perspectives in the context of pub/sub 
services. 
 
2.1. The Anonymity Perspective 
Anonymity in pub/sub is naturally preserved, to some extent, by the system design, which 
decouples the clients of the service, the subscribers, from the publishers. A publisher does 
not know to which of the service subscribers the published data is delivered, and a 
subscriber does not know from which publisher it received a given publication. The 
decoupled nature of the communication is enforced by the middleware providing the 
pub/sub service. In most scenarios the provider of the pub/sub service is entitled to know 
the identity of its clients or that of the data providers, and consequently trusted not to 
divulge these identities. 
The basic level of anonymity provided by decoupling is typically acceptable, given that 
subscribers emit a request and expect receiving information only from the pub/sub service. 
This is fundamentally different from other service models (i.e., electronic voting), where 
the only purpose of the service is to process information originating from the clients. Of 
course, situations could exist when stronger anonymity guarantees are necessary (e.g., a 
free service for monitoring some patients’ state and notifying them about some developing 
condition, where patients would not want to expose their identities). In Section 3 we 
overview several techniques that can be used to provide such guarantees. However, in the 
vast majority of use cases clients pay for the pub/sub service, which already implies 
revealing their identity to the service. Therefore, the focus on data privacy typically lies 
less with anonymity and more with confidentiality. 
 
2.2. The Confidentiality Perspective 
Data privacy, from a confidentiality perspective, refers to the protection against the access 
to sensitive information in queries emitted by the system clients – in subscriptions, or in 
sensitive information disseminated using the pub/sub service – in publications. Trust, in 
respect to a node (machine) where the pub/sub system is deployed, refers to a degree of 
confidence in the entities able to access the specific node and the sensitive data at that node. 
Multiple degrees of trust can be defined, depending on the sensitivity of some specific data. 
Similarly, multiple degrees of trust can be defined with respect to the different entities that 
can access a specific node. For simplicity of the discussion, we consider, for now, a single 
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node trust level. We say that a node where a distributed pub/sub system is deployed is 
trusted if we have full confidence in all the entities able to access that node and read 
sensitive data it holds. Similarly, we consider a node untrusted if we do not have 
confidence in any entity able to access the node and read its sensitive data. In case of a 
trusted node there is no need for data privacy. In case of an untrusted node, mechanisms 
for enforcing data privacy are required.1 
As introduced in Section 1, trust and data privacy issues in pub/sub services become 
more stringent with the externalization to public cloud infrastructures. Essentially clients 
can trust the provider of the pub/sub middleware to properly operate the service, without 
willingly leaking any sensitive data. However, when this pub/sub service is deployed on 
virtual machines on a public cloud, multiple other entities, potentially with malicious 
intent, can gain access to the respective cloud nodes, rendering these untrusted.  
 
Figure 2. High-level overview of an attack scenario via VM co-location in the stock market use case 
A first category of threats is represented by attackers who either have an interest in 
finding subscribers’ intentions or in accessing a publications stream without permission. If 
a virtual machine of an attacker is placed in the public cloud on the same untrusted node 
as for the victim pub/sub service, a variety of side-channel attacks can be attempted for 
leaking sensitive information [29, 36]. Figure 2 presents an overview of the threat scenario 
adapted to our stock market example, where a malicious investor attempts to gain 
information on competitors from co-located virtual machine. An empirical study 
performed in 2015 [33] on the placement of virtual machines on U.S. regions of Amazon 
EC2, Google Compute Engine and Microsoft Azure cloud infrastructures has shown that 
an attacker using 10 to 30 virtual machine instances had a probability of co-residency on 
the same node as a victim’s virtual machine that ranges from 0.3 to 1, depending on the 
number of virtual machines run by the victim. A more recent study from 2017 [1], 
conducted with the participation of the U.S. Army Research Laboratory, devised a 
mathematical model for computing the probability of co-residency for an attacker’s virtual 
machine with a victim’s machine, confirming this threat.  
A second category of threats, and subsequent interest in providing data privacy 
guarantees, gained momentum following the “Snowden effect” [17] of global surveillance 
disclosures. A subscriber might not be comfortable with knowing that his interests might 
be spied upon by a governmental agency. Even though the provider of a pub/sub service 
might be located in a country that is theoretically regarded as well-regulated from this 
perspective (i.e., the European space with the adoption of the GDPR), if the provider is 
using a public cloud infrastructure for his service, the machines where the service 
effectively runs might be geographically located elsewhere, and under the legal jurisdiction 
of another country. This may expose the infrastructure where the service resides to hidden 
 
1 In a more general case, if multiple degrees of trust are defined at the level of one node, then privacy of 
some data should be enforced against some entities able to access that node. We reference the 
generalization in our trust model approach proposed in Section 4. 
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surveillance from that country. This exposure is accentuated if the cloud provider 
periodically migrates virtual instances across hosts located in different jurisdictions.  
Both types of threats have a similar target: gaining access to sensitive data on untrusted 
nodes. In practical deployments, a part of the pub/sub service can be externalized to a 
public cloud for cost effectiveness, whereas the other part can be deployed on a private 
infrastructure that belongs to the service operator, which is normally considered secure. 
This, as well as different sensitivity levels of data, requires defining a more complex trust 
model for the nodes in the system, which we propose in Section 4. Nevertheless, threats 
can be addressed by implementing data privacy mechanisms on the untrusted broker nodes, 
more precisely techniques for preserving confidentiality of subscriptions and publications. 
The natural approach would be encrypting this data. The difficulty lies in simultaneously 
maintaining the functionality of the pub/sub service. If the data cannot be accessed at the 
level of the untrusted broker node, then the pub/sub matching cannot be performed. 
Therefore, specific mechanisms are required. We provide an overview of the existing 
approaches for such mechanisms in Section 3. Several general aspects should be 
considered in relation with the practical use case when choosing a solution: 
 
a) Expressivity of the pub/sub model. In topic-based pub/sub the matching operation is 
simpler, implying typically only evaluation of the equality on topic. Therefore, it is 
normally enough to provide support for confidential equality matching. Matching in 
content/based pub/sub involves more complex operations over subscriptions’ 
constraints, such as numerical range evaluations, substring comparisons, etc.  
b) Specific sensitivity of messages. Depending on the use case, data privacy might be 
important for subscriptions, publications, or both. Most developed mechanisms take 
in account both types of messages. However, depending on the trust assumptions, 
selectively protecting only one type of messages might be acceptable and could 
increase the cost-effectiveness of the solution. 
c) Payload of publications. A publication always contains a payload in a topic-based 
pub/sub scenario, including the effective publication content. In content-based 
pub/sub this payload might be absent (e.g., in the stock market example, all 
information on a quote can be included in the header fields used in matching). This 
payload, when present, requires similar protection as the header. Since the payload is 
not subject to the matching operation, standard encryption techniques can be used. 
 
3. Mechanisms for Data Privacy in Pub/Sub Systems 
We now overview mechanisms that can be implemented for preserving data privacy in 
pub/sub systems. We follow the two perspectives – anonymity and confidentiality – 
discussed in the previous section. We also group these mechanisms according to their 
specific subject of application. This allows us to establish a set of data privacy properties, 
a notion which we further use in defining a trust model in Section 4. 
 
3.1. Anonymity Mechanisms 
Mechanisms for preserving anonymity in pub/sub have the purpose of protecting the 
identity of subscribers and/or publishers by respectively hiding the source of subscriptions 
and/or publications from an untrusted node. We can, therefore, define two data privacy 
properties, according the subject protected by the mechanism: subscriber anonymity and 
publisher anonymity. As discussed in Section 2, anonymity has less importance in pub/sub 
systems due to the natural decoupling between publishers and subscribers, and also because 
in many use cases subscribers are paying customers, whose identity should be known at 
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the broker node level for delivering the service2. Most techniques that can be applied in a 
pub/sub scenario are derived from more general techniques in distributed systems. We 
overview the main approaches in the following. 
a) Proxy forwarding and re-encryption. This mechanism relies on one or more trusted 
third party proxy nodes that forward (and potentially encrypt [37]) the messages, and 
send them on behalf of the original sources after removing their identity. Typically, 
choosing from multiple proxy nodes can harden the system against brute force 
attempts to identify the source via traffic monitoring. Due to the fact that the identity 
of the sender is discarded, this technique is adequate mainly for publishers anonymity 
(i.e., using the proxy for sending the publication to an untrusted broker node).  
Subscribers anonymity would require maintaining a mapping history of discarded 
source identities at the level of the proxy, for tracing back the route towards 
subscribers. Since keeping such a mapping with the exact identifier of a subscriber on 
a third-party proxy node could still be a vulnerability (and make the proxy itself a 
target), a more cautious approach is to map the source domain of the subscription. This 
domain can be represented by a private trusted infrastructure, which is under full 
control of the service provider, and where a final mapping is kept for reaching the 
client of the service. The objective is to disallow an attacker from tracing the identity 
of the subscription beyond this trusted domain, up to the effective subscriber. 
A disadvantage is the high cost of maintaining such a setup.   
b) Onion routing. This is an alternative, more secure variation, to simple proxy 
forwarding for ensuring publishers anonymity. It is based on the concept of mix 
nodes [7], for which the most significant implementation is the TOR network [13]. 
Instead of a single proxy, an onion path of mix nodes can be used for sending an 
encrypted publication to a pub/sub broker. Each mix in the path can only decipher the 
next mix hop. Since the path must be fully known for the encryption at the source of 
the message, this mechanism cannot be easily used to send the publication from the 
untrusted broker up to the final subscriber without maintaining expensive persistent 
channels. 
 
3.2. Confidentiality Mechanisms 
We now discuss confidentiality mechanisms of content-based pub/sub. Confidentiality in 
the less expressive topic-based pub/sub can be provided by a subset of the content-based 
mechanisms. As before we focus our discussion on protecting untrusted broker nodes 
located in a public cloud where the pub/sub service middleware is deployed. We can define 
a set of properties according to the subject of application of the confidentiality 
mechanisms: subscription confidentiality, publication confidentiality and payload 
confidentiality. The first two refer to the protection of the messages’ headers used for 
matching by brokers, while the latter refers to the confidentiality of any extra payload that 
a publication might contain.  
Subscription and Publication Confidentiality 
Most mechanisms are designed to provide both subscriptions and publications 
confidentiality, therefore we overview these together. Typically, a form of encryption is 
used allowing the untrusted broker node to determine the matching result without accessing 
the sensitive content of the subscription or the publication header. Decryption is not always 
provided since the final purpose is the matching result (only the publication payload is 
 
2 We refer here to identity strictly from the perspective of the source of a subscription required as 
destination for delivering the matching publications, i.e., the source IP address of a subscriber. The 
individual identity of a subscriber client can of course be subject of anonymization at the level of a broker 
node, depending on the agreement between the client and the service provider, using various techniques 
(i.e., pseudonyms). However, this falls outside the scope of the effective operation of the pub/sub service, 
since it does not interfere with the routing of the publications towards the subscriber.  
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delivered to the subscriber after a match). However, when publications do not include a 
payload, the information of interest for subscribers resides in the publication header fields, 
in which case decryption must be supported. Since this case is similar to the payload 
confidentiality we discuss it later. In the following we summarize the main categories of 
mechanisms that provide confidential matching. 
a) Specific cryptographic schemes. A series of cryptographic schemes were developed 
for allowing an untrusted broker to match an encrypted subscription with encrypted 
publications. Some of these schemes [9, 23] have roots in homomorphic encryption, 
preserving an isomorphism between the encrypted comparison of subscriptions and 
publications and the equivalent plaintext comparison. Other schemes [18, 20, 28, 32] 
rely on domain mappings that permit translating any range or string comparison to an 
equality comparison in the encrypted form. We surveyed in our previous work [25] 
such encrypted matching schemes. The impediment of adopting such schemes in a 
practical pub/sub scenario typically lies in the difficulty of implementing a necessary 
key management solution. We discuss this issue in the final part of this section. 
b) Standard cryptographic schemes and access control. Some of the proposed 
mechanisms [2, 19, 34] rely on standard cryptographic protocols for protecting 
sensitive fields in publications and constraints in subscriptions, which do not permit 
matching these fields on untrusted broker nodes. The solutions typically define various 
access control models, allowing the brokers to perform matching only over certain 
non-sensitive fields according to the access control policies. Depending on the 
solution, various levels of sensitivity for message fields (and respectively trust for 
brokers) can be defined. A disadvantage of this approach is that matching over 
sensitive fields is not allowed. 
c) Trusted hardware support. Some recent CPUs offer the possibility to perform the 
matching in hardware-protected memory zones such that the access can be restricted 
even for the owner or operator of the physical machine, i.e., using the Intel SGX or 
AMD SEV technologies [22]. This is a novel approach towards confidentiality in 
pub/sub, with yet few implementations [27]. A limitation of the solution is its 
dependence on this hardware support. 
Payload Confidentiality and the Key Exchange Issue 
As discussed in Section 2.2, payload confidentiality is typically ensured by using standard 
encryption schemes. The publication payload is not subject of a matching operation on the 
untrusted broker nodes. Therefore, no access is needed to the payload, so in theory any 
end-to-end encryption is sufficient.  
Symmetric encryption standards (i.e., AES [11]) are typically recommended due to cost 
effectiveness. However, in this case the encryption key is secret and should be exchanged 
by the two communicating parties. The pub/sub context decouples the communication 
between the publisher and the subscriber. Normally it is impossible to know prior to 
matching which subscriber will receive a certain publication. This creates a significant 
difficulty in solving the required key exchange.  
Using asymmetric encryption (e.g., RSA [30]), where the publication payload could be 
encrypted with the public key of a subscriber who then decrypts with an associated private 
key, poses a similar problem despite the absence of key exchange. The publisher would 
not know who the receiving subscriber is, and consequently whose public key to use in the 
encryption. Besides this, public key encryption is typically costly and is applied only on 
messages of small dimension. 
Currently, establishing a key correspondence between publishers and subscribers for 
payload confidentiality is one of the major open issues in privacy preserving pub/sub 
systems. The issue is even more severe considering that it also applies to publication 
confidentiality when the publication is only formed of the header used in matching, which 
should be decrypted when reaching the subscriber.  
The easiest way to approach the key exchange is by abandoning the complete 
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decoupled nature of the system in favor of a partial coupling where a publisher would know 
at least the group of subscribers who might receive emitted publications, and pre-exchange 
a group encryption key with these. However, new issues arise: 
 Confidentiality breaches. The size of the group of clients should remain limited. Pre-
exchanging a key with a larger group increases the chance of confidentiality breaches: a 
malicious subscriber could try to intercept payloads sent to a different subscriber and 
encrypted with the same key. Specific cryptographic techniques exist for efficient 
dissemination of keys in groups preventing some breaches, such as broadcast 
encryption [15] with tracing traitors [10] who would leak the key outside a trusted group. 
So far, these techniques have been applied to the protection of secure pay-per-view 
channels in media transmissions and for implementing digital rights management (DRM) 
policies, where the encrypted data sent to the group does not differ from one client to the 
other and where, therefore, a client of the trusted group would not be interested in spying 
another client. Adapting such techniques to pub/sub is an open problem.  
 Limited scalability. One of the advantages of the decoupled nature of pub/sub systems is 
the potential for scaling to large numbers of subscribers [31]. This is achieved through 
various methods, some implying dynamic changes in the system such as work migration 
from one node to another for load balancing [4] or the addition of new nodes (i.e., new 
publishers). An initial mapping between publishers and subscribers due to a key pre-
exchange would limit the flexibility of any potential changes and could consequently 
impair scalability.  
 Potential anonymity breaches. A pre-exchange of encryption keys between known sets 
of publishers and subscribers could expose their identity to one another. Although, as 
discussed, this might not be an issue in some situations, in other use cases this would 
breach anonymity properties as defined in Section 3.1. However, this problem is typically 
easy to resolve by coordinating the key exchange through a trusted third party, which 
guarantees anonymizing the identity of the key receiving nodes. 
The key management in pub/sub systems also presents another difficulty, this time related 
to subscription confidentiality. In a general context, a key used in the encryption of an 
information stream must be periodically refreshed to resist brute force attacks. If encrypted 
matching is the chosen mechanism for subscriptions confidentiality, the new key encryption 
should also be applied to subscriptions previously stored by untrusted broker nodes. Otherwise, 
the matching will not be possible after a key refresh since publications will be encrypted with 
different keys. The naïve solution is that subscribers re-submit all subscriptions encrypted with 
the new key. This can inflict an unwanted load on the system which might cause communication 
and latency issues. Only few solutions have been proposed for solving this problem [26], but 
these are highly dependent on the chosen encryption scheme. 
 
4. Towards a Trust Model for Privacy Preserving Publish/Subscribe 
We believe that besides the issues identified in the previous section, a general reason for 
the lack of adoption of mechanisms for data privacy in pub/sub systems is that only few 
solutions consider the necessity of a trust model. Indeed, most solutions only focus on the 
technical details of the proposed mechanism. In this section we lay the ground for a trust 
model, which we believe can help in integrating mechanisms referred in Section 3 in a 
practical deployment. The following elements compose this model: 
 Trust domain. In Section 2.2 we referred for the clarity of the discussion to a single 
degree of trust. However, in practice, multiple degrees can be defined depending on 
the sensitivity of data and the privacy needs of the use case. We consider one given 
set of nodes grouped in the same trust domain, if the expectations in terms of privacy 
preservation for these machines are exactly the same. A trust domain does not only 
correspond to the machines it contains but also includes network links. If the 
machines in a trust domain are trusted for not leaking private information, their 
interconnection links are also assumed to guarantee a similar level of privacy. 
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 Strength of properties. The privacy expectations can be ensured via data privacy 
mechanisms and modelled through the properties defined in Section 3: subscribers 
and publishers anonymity, and subscriptions, publications and payload 
confidentiality. Until now we mainly referred to a single attacker with a purpose of 
spying on sensitive information on one untrusted node. However, if the attacker is 
able to implement a colluding attack, i.e., accessing data on multiple nodes, then the 
attacker can potentially gain a significant advantage against some specific 
mechanisms for data privacy, which are not designed to resist to collusion (e.g., 
gaining the capability to derive encryption keys). Therefore, it is useful to specify in 
addition to a required property in a trust domain, the needed strength for the 
respective property, where strength specifies the colluding power under which the 
property should hold. We formalize this in our model as tuples having the structure: 
<property, strength>. We consider specifically the following variants: 
a) <property, 0> identifies the case of a trust domain, where nodes are trusted 
and the property must not be enforced (the attacker has no access); 
b) <property, 1> identifies the case of a trust domain, where no collusion can 
occur (the attacker’s access is strictly limited to at most one node); 
c) <property, k> identifies the case of a trust domain, where collusion might 
occur, with the attacker’s access limited to at most k >1 colluding nodes. 
Ordering the properties permits establishing the general trust level of a trust domain 
in comparison to other domains. More precisely, we can distinguish the following 
cases for two domains A and B: 
1) Equally trusted: if all trust properties and their strength associated to the trust 
domain A are also associated to the trust domain B, and conversely. 
2) Less (more) trusted: domain A is less (more) trusted than domain B if for 
properties associated with domain B, domain A has at least one corresponding 
property with higher (lower) strength, with the other properties being of equal 
strength For instance a domain A with (<subscription confidentiality, 1>, 
<publisher anonymity, 1>) is less trusted than a domain B with 
(<subscription confidentiality, 1>, <publisher anonymity, 0>).  
3) Direct comparison not possible: this is the case if different properties have 
opposite associated strength, for instance if domain A has (<subscriber 
anonymity, 1> <publisher anonymity, 0>) and domain B has (<subscriber 
anonymity, 0> <publisher anonymity, 1>). In such instances most powerful 
common properties can be defined: (<subscriber anonymity, 1> <publisher 
anonymity, 0>). This set, as the rest of the ordering, is useful for deploying 
privacy mechanisms across domains as discussed below. 
 Trust boundaries. Nodes running the pub/sub service might reside on different trust 
domains, where different properties with different strength are required. For 
preserving the appropriate strength of these properties, it might be necessary to 
enforce privacy mechanisms, or respectively to remove their effect, when 
publications and subscriptions cross the trust domains. For the purpose of modelling 
these changes we define such domain crossing as a trust boundary. We consider two 
types of such boundaries:  
a) Hard boundary. This is the boundary that appears when crossing from a more 
trusted domain to a less trusted domain. The properties required in the less 
trusted domain must be enforced before reaching this domain; 
b) Soft boundary. This is the boundary that appears when crossing from a less 
trusted domain to a more trusted domain, requiring properties with lower 
strength. Any stronger data privacy property can be disabled any time after 
crossing the boundary. 
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When two domains require some properties that cannot be compared, the boundary 
is associated with the set of most powerful common properties, as defined above. 
These should be enforced when crossing into both domains for preserving trust. 
In Figure 3 we present an example of our trust model elements following the course of a 
publication on a simple deployment over five trusted domains and a non-trusted one. 
 
Figure 3.  Trust model over a pub/sub service deployment with five trusted domains and an untrusted domain. It 
shows a publisher (P) generating a publication, which is then matched by an overlay of brokers (B) and routed to 
matching subscribers (S) 
The implementation of the model in practice would also require the presence of an external 
trusted component called the Trust Relationship Authority, TRA for short. The responsibility 
of the TRA is to match the trust domain properties to the privacy preserving mechanisms and 
apply these mechanisms at trust boundaries. A more precise description of the operation of this 
TRA requires a discussion about key exchange support between the domains, which as 
presented in Section 3.2 is still an open problem and dependent on the actual mechanisms used.  
We note that while the TRA can be simply considered as a centralized component, the 
possibility of integrating it as a decentralized set of cooperating operators that would only run 




We have presented a study about the trust and data privacy issues and necessities in 
publish/subscribe services, an important area of distributed systems designed for information 
dissemination used in multiple use cases and environments. We have discussed aspects related 
to data privacy from two perspectives: anonymity and confidentiality, and we have overviewed 
the most important categories of mechanisms used for enforcing specific privacy properties.  
Finally, we have defined the basic ground for a trust model, open to further development, but 
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